The capital structure puzzle: On the existence of an optimal capital structure by Lahiani, Mohamed
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Theses Digitization Project John M. Pfau Library 
2003 
The capital structure puzzle: On the existence of an optimal 
capital structure 
Mohamed Lahiani 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project 
 Part of the Corporate Finance Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lahiani, Mohamed, "The capital structure puzzle: On the existence of an optimal capital structure" (2003). 
Theses Digitization Project. 2350. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/2350 
This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE:







of the Requirements for the Degree




THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE:













Dr. Otto Chang, Department CJ
Accounting & Finance 1
© 2003 Mohamed Lahiani
ABSTRACT
A perennial debate in corporate finance concerns the 
question of optimal capital structure: given the level of 
total capital necessary to support a company's activities, 
is there a way of dividing up that capital into debt and 
equity that maximizes current firm value? And, if so, what 
are the critical factors in setting the leverage ratio for
a given company?
Corporate finance researchers have long been puzzled
by low corporate debt ratios given debt's corporate tax 
advantage. What makes the capital structure debate
especially intriguing is that the different theories 
represent such different, and in some ways almost 
diametrically opposed, decision-making processes. For 
instance, some researchers defend Miller and Modigliani by 
arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy 
are largely "irrelevant" in the sense that they have no 
significant, predictable effects on corporate financing. 
However, another school of thought holds that corporate 
financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers 
to balance the tax shields of greater debt against the 
increased probability and costs of financial distress, 
including those arising from corporate underinvestment.
But if too much debt can destroy value by causing
iii
financial distress and underinvestment, other schools of 
thought have argued that too little debt, at least in 
large, mature companies- can lead to overinvestment and 
low returns on capital.
The purpose of this paper is to present a literature 
survey about the Capital structure puzzle theories and 
studies by different schools of thoughts over the past 
half a century. My concern is to illustrate the findings 
of capital structure studies and to present their 
contributions to the corporate finance literature, and to 
give my personal opinion about these results concluding by
my estimation of the optimal capital structure. Thus, I am
going to emphasize the role of corporate finance in
supporting an interior optimum capital structure.
iv
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Financing policy of firms requires managers to 
identify ways of finding new investment. The managers have
three main alternatives; use retained earnings, borrow 
through debt instruments, or issue new equity shares.
Hence, the standard capital structure of a firm includes 
equity (including retained earnings), and debt; these
components of capital structure reflect firm ownership
structure in the sense that the first component reflects 
ownership by shareholders while the second component 
represents ownership by debt holders. This pattern is 
found in developing and developed countries alike. 
Financing policy, capital structure and firm ownership are 
all strongly linked in explaining how economic agents form 
and modify their asset acquisition behavior through firms 
and capital markets, and thereby influence their incomes 
and returns to asset holdings, whether in the form of 
direct remuneration, capital gains or dividends.
Corporate capital structure has been one of the most 
popular issues in financial economics. Many theoretical 
and empirical studies have been done to examine the 
effects of corporate capital structure determinants
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including taxes, profitability, firm size; type of assets, 
volatility, and business risk on the firm's financing 
decision. Two competing theories have been raised to 
explain corporate capital structure: The trade-off 
hypothesis and the pecking order theory.
In the trade-off hypothesis, firms choose their 
optimal debt ratio by weighing the.benefits (tax of 
interest payment) and costs (potential bankruptcy costs) 
of debt financing. In this model, taxes are regarded as a 
potentially important factor. Since interest payments can 
be deducted in determining corporate taxable income, an 
incentive exists for the firm to use debt financing even 
if this incentive is reduced by the tax disadvantage of 
personal income taxes paid by the recipient on the 
interest payments.'
The trade-off hypothesis focuses on the tax advantage 
of debt, thus, implying a positive relationship between a 
firm's value and its debt ratio. Moreover, every firm has 
its own optimal leverage target that maximizes its firm 
value, and a firm's actual leverage is expected to revert
towards the target leverage.
In the pecking order theory, firms finance new 
investments in a specific order: First, with retained 
earnings, then with safe debt, then with risky debt, and
2
i finally with equity to minimize asymmetric information
1
! costs. Compared to the trade-off hypothesis, the pecking
I order theory focuses on the profitability, implying a
I
' negative relationship between a firm's value and its debt
! ratio. Moreover, in this model, there is no optimal or
i
| target leverage.
; Some writers argue that corporate managers making
I
financing decisions are concerned primarily with the
. "signaling" effects of such decisions-for example, the
I
I tendency of stock prices to fall significantly in response
I
j to common stock offerings (which can make such offerings 
[ very expensive for existing shareholders) and to rise in 
jresponse to leverage increasing recapitalizations.
I
■Building on this signaling argument, Stewart Myers has
Ij suggested that corporate capital structures are simply the 
I cumulative result of individual financing decisions in 
'which managers follow a financial pecking order-one in 
which retained earnings are preferred to outside
financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside 
funding is required.
According to Myers, corporate managers making 
financing decisions are not really thinking about an 
optimal capital structure that is, a long-run targeted 
!debt-to-equity ratio they eventually want to achieve.
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Instead, they simply take the "path of least resistance" 
and choose what then appears to be the low-cost financing
vehicle-generally debt-with little thought about the 
future consequences of these choices.
The purpose of this study is to find the optimal 
corporate capital structure for firms. What is the optimal 
capital structure of a company? What factors make a 
company prefer debt financing to equity financing?
4
CHAPTER TWO
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE
A firm consists of assets which produce a stream of
cash flows. The capital structure decision determines how
those assets will be paid for, and thus how the cash flows 
will be allocated among different claims (debt, equity,
etc.).
The best way to think about an optimal firm structure 
is that the current owners of a firm are thinking about
II how to sell their firm today (Welch, 1996). Their goal is
iI to design a corporate charter that maximizes the total
1I|market-value of their firm today, that is the price that
ilnew investors will be willing to pay to acquire the firm
ifrom the old investors. The corporate charter must not
I
I only specify the voting rules, the procedure to replace 
j incumbent managers and how the charter can be changed in 
'the future, but also how future earnings are to be split
among different owners (such as bondholders and 
stockholders) and stakeholders (such as customers, 
workers, and suppliers). The agreement how to split up 
future earnings-either explicitly outlined or implicitly 
allowed to be changed in the future-is the firm's 
financial structure: rules that specify who receives the
5
proceeds of (possibly uncertain) future cash-flows (Welch, 
1996).
Historically, corporations have been using bonds and 
stocks (equity). In general, bonds ("financial leverage") 
are like loans, promising certain payoffs. Equity is like 
ownership, receiving whatever is left over after the 
promises to bondholders have been honored. In addition, 
modern corporations can use a variety of financial 
instruments that promise different future payoffs to
various buyers under various scenarios: convertible debt,
equity, warrants, derivatives, leases and trade credit. 
Firms can also collateralize assets and/or borrow from 
banks. Our discussion will focus mostly on the choice 
between simple debt and equity, although the purpose of 
this study is to provide the necessary intuition to
understand why other financial instruments can be useful.
Theory
The capital structure puzzle is intended to remind 
analysts about the Dividend puzzle and Fischer Black's 
well known saying: "What should the corporation do about 
dividend policy? We don't know." Stewart C. Myers, in his 
article entitled: "The Capital Structure Puzzle," started 
his argument by asking: "How do firms choose their capital
6
structure?" Again, the very usual answer is, "We don't
know."
Researchers and analysts know more about the dividend 
policy puzzle than they do know about the capital
structure one. John Lintner's model of how firms set
dividends dates back to 1956, and it still seems to work
in Stewart C. Myers' opinion. We know that stock prices 
are extremely sensitive to any unexpected dividend 
changes; this makes clear that dividends have information
content; this information dates back at least to Miller
and Modigliani, 1961. Myers argues that we do not know 
whether high dividend yield increases the expected return 
required by investors, as adding taxes to the Miller and 
Modigliani proof of dividend irrelevance suggests, but 
financial analysts are at least investigating and
advancing at this concern.
We do not know that much about capital structure. We 
do not know how firms choose the debt, equity or 
securities they issue. There is not enough research and 
proof testing whether the relationship between financial 
leverage and the demanded return by investors is as the 
wholesome Miller and Modigliani theory foretells.
Scholars and analysts have thought long and hard 
about what these insights imply for optimal capital
7
structure. Financial economists translated these theories
of optimal capital structure into more or less definite 
advice to managers. However, their theories do not seem to 
explain actual financing behavior, and it seems bigheaded 
to advise firms on optimal capital structure when they are 
still far from explaining actual decisions.
There are two different ways of thinking about
capital structure; the first is a static tradeoff
framework that sees the firm as setting a target
debt-to-total-assets ratio and gradually moving towards 
it, the same way that a company adjusts dividends to move
towards a target payout ratio. The second way is an 
old-fashioned pecking order framework, in which the firm
prefers a cheaper capital, and so it favors internal to 
external financing and debt to equity if it issues 
securities. In the unadulterated pecking order theory, the 
firm has no well-defined target debt ratio.
The Static Tradeoff Hypothesis
A company's optimal debt ratio is always seen as 
determined by a tradeoff of the costs and benefits of 
borrowing, holding the firm's assets and investment plans 
constant. The firm is portrayed as balancing the value of 
interest tax shields against various costs of bankruptcy 
or financial embarrassment. Of course, there is a
8
controversy about how valuable the tax shields are, and 
which, if any, of the costs of financial embarrassment are 
material. But these disagreements give only variations on 
a theme. The firm is supposed to substitute debt for 
equity, and equity for debt, until the value of the firm 
is maximized (Myers, 1984).
Costs of adjustment: if there were no costs of
adjustment, and the static tradeoff theory was correct, 
then each firm's observed debt ratio should be its optimal 
ratio. On the other hand, there are costs and consequently 
lags, in adjusting to the optimum. Firms cannot instantly 
offset the unsystematic events that smack them away from 
the optimum, so there should be some cross-sectional
spreading of actual debt ratio across a model of firms 
having the same target ratio (Myers, 1984) .
Huge adjustment costs could possibly explain the
observed broad variation in actual debt ratios, since 
firms would be forced into long expeditions away from 
their optimal ratios. Although there is nothing in the 
typical static tradeoff stories suggesting that 
modification costs are a first order concern-in fact, they 
are rarely brought up. According to Myers, "Invoking them 
without modeling them is a cop-out."
9
Any cross-sectional test of financing behavior should 
specify whether firms' debt ratios diverge because they 
have different optimal ratios or because their actual 
ratios deviate from optimal ones. It is easy to mix up the 
two cases. For example, Myers mentioned in his article, 
"The Capital Structure Puzzle" about the early
cross-sectional studies which attempted to test Miller and 
Modigliani's proposition. These studies tried to find out
if differences in leverage affected the market value of
the firm or the market capitalization rate of its
operating income. With observation, Myers affirmed we can 
quickly see the problem: if adjustment costs are small, 
and each firm in the sample is at its optimum or close to 
it, then the in sample dispersion of debt ratios must
reflect differences in risk or in other variables
affecting optimal capital structure. But then Miller and 
Modigliani's proposition I cannot be tested unless the
effects of risk and other variables on firm value can be
adjusted for. This shows how inflexible and tough it is to 
hold "other things constant" in cross-sectional 
regressions.
The easy way to make sense to these tests is to 
assume that adjustment costs are small, but managers do 
not know or care what the optimal debt ratio is, and thus
10
do not stay close to it. On the other hand, if we do not 
take such an assumption, then if adjustment costs are 
small, and firms stay near their target debt ratios, it 
will be tough to understand the observed diversity of 
capital structures across firms that seem similar in a 
static tradeoff framework. If adjustment costs are so
large, that some firms take extended excursions away from 
their targets, then we ought to give less attention to 
refining our static tradeoff anecdotes and relatively more 
attention to understanding what the adjustment costs are, 
why they are so important, and how rational managers would 
respond to them.
The Pecking Order Theory
This theory is opposite to the former one with a 
competing popular story based on a financing pecking
order, it assumes that:
1. Firms prefer internal finance
2. They adapt their target dividend payout ratios 
to their investment opportunities, although 
dividends are sticky and target payout ratios 
are only gradually adjusted to shifts in the 
extent of valuable investment opportunities.
3. Sticky dividend policies, plus unpredictable 
fluctuations in profitability and investment
11
opportunities, mean that internally-generated 
cash flow may be more or less than investment 
outlays. If it is less, the firm first draws
down its cash balance or marketable securities
portfolio. If it is more, the firm first pays
off debt or invests in cash or marketable
securities. If the surplus persists, it may 
gradually increase its target payout ratio.
4. If external finance is required, firms issue the 
safest security first, that is, they start with 
debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as 
convertible bonds, then maybe equity as a last 
resort. In this story, there is no well-defined 
target debt-equity mix, because there are two 
kinds of equity, internal and external, one at 
the top of the pecking order and one at the
bottom. Each firm's observed debt ratio reflects
its cumulative requirements for external
finance.
According to Donald H. Chew, Jr. in his book
"Corporate Finance, Where Theory Meets Practice", the 
pecking order signaling theory says that financing 
decisions are based at least in part, on management's 
perception on the "fairness" of the market's current
12
valuation of the stock. Declared as simply as possible, 
the theory suggests that, in order to minimize the 
information costs of issuing securities, a company is more 
likely to issue debt than equity if the firm appears
undervalued, and to issue stock rather.than debt if the
firm seems overvalued.
The pecking order theory takes this argument one step
farther, suggesting that the information costs associated 
with issuing securities are so large that they dominate 
all other considerations. According to this theory,
companies maximize value by systematically choosing to 
finance new investments with the cheapest available source 
of funds. Specifically, the companies prefer internally 
generated funds being typically the retained earnings, to 
external funding. If outside funds are necessary, the 
companies prefer debt to equity because of the lower
information costs associated with debt issues. Chew
confirms as Myers did that companies issue equity only as 
a last resort, when their debt capacity has been
exhausted.
The pecking order theory would thus suggest that 
companies with few investment opportunities and
substantial free cash flow will have low debt ratios- and
that high-growth firms with lower operating cash flows
13
will have higher debt ratios. In this sense, the theory 
suggests not only that interest tax shields and the costs
of financial distress are at most a second-order concern
but also that the logic of the pecking order actually
leads to a set of predictions that are precisely the
opposite of those offered by the tax and contracting cost 
arguments presented earlier.
The preference of public corporations for internal 
financing and the relative infrequency of stock issues by 
established firms have long been attributed to the 
separation of ownership and control and the desire of 
managers to avoid the discipline of capital markets. 
According to Myers (1984), managers who maximize market 
value will avoid external equity financing if they have
better information than outside investors are rational.
The pecking order theory explains why the bulk of 
external financing comes from debt. It also explains why 
more profitable firms borrow less: not because their 
target debt ratio is low- in the pecking order they don't 
have a target- but because profitable firms have more 
internal financing available. Less profitable firms 
require external financing, and consequently accumulate
debt.
14
Of course, the pecking order theory can be quickly 
rejected if we require it to explain everything. Myers 
authenticates that there are plenty of examples of firms 
issuing stock when they could issue investment-grade debt. 
But if we consider aggregates, we find that the heavy
reliance on internal finance and debt is clear. For all
non-financial corporations over the decade 1973-1982
(Myers, 1984), internally generated cash covered on 
average 62 percent of capital expenditures, including 
investment in inventory and other current assets. The bulk 
of demanded external financing comes from borrowing.
Stewart C. Myers confirms that writers on "managerial 
capitalism" have interpreted firms' reliance on internal 
finance as a by-product of the separation of ownership and 
control: professional managers avoid relying on external 
finance because it would subject them to the discipline of 
the capital market. Donaldson's 1969 book was not 
primarily about marginal capitalism, but it nevertheless 
states that the financing decisions of the firms he
studied were not directed towards maximizing shareholder 
wealth, and that scholars attempting to explain those 
decisions would have to start by recognizing the 
managerial view of corporate finance (Myers, 1984). This 
conclusion is natural given the state of finance theory in
15
the 1960s. Today, it is not so obvious that financing by a 
pecking order goes against shareholders' interests.
An argument can always be made for internal financing 
to avoid issue costs, and if external finance is needed
for debt to avoid the still higher costs of equity. But 
issue costs in themselves are not big enough to override 
the costs and benefits of leverage emphasized in the
static tradeoff story.
Discussion of the Theory 
and its Evidence
In investigating corporate finance behavior and how 
that behavior affects security returns, Myers (1984) 
presented two approaches to understanding capital 
structure that are evaluated with respect to 5 aspects of 
financing behavior: 1) internal versus external financing, 
2) timing of security issues, 3) borrowing against 
intangibles and growth opportunities, 4) exchange offers 
and 5) issue or repurchase of shares. A static trade-off 
framework is presented in which the firm is viewed as
setting a target debt ratio and gradually moving toward
it, in much the same way that a firm adjusts dividends to 
move toward a target payout ratio. In contrast, a pecking 
order approach in which the firm prefers internal to 
external financing and debt to equity if it issues
16
securities is developed. In the pure pecking model, the 
firm has no well-defined target debt ratio. A modified 
pecking order strategy, incorporating those elements of 
the static trade-off model which have clear empirical 
support, provides a better approach to understanding 
corporate financing behavior.
The way I am going to start discussing this theory of 
"Capital Structure Puzzle" and its evidence is by listing 
what we know about financing behavior and by trying to 
make sense of this knowledge in terms of the two
hypotheses stated earlier. My discussion and analysis will
be based on financial economists and researchers'
findings. I will start by stating some facts about
financing behavior, before generalizing them.
Internal versus External Equity
Combined investment expenditures are predominately 
financed by debt issues and internally-generated funds.
New stock issues play a relatively small part. This 
reality is what the pecking order hypothesis suggested in 
the first place (Myers, 1984). But it might also be 
explained in a static tradeoff theory by adding 
significant transaction costs of equity issues and noting 
the favorable tax treatment of capital gains relative to 
dividends. This would make external equity relatively
17
expensive. It would explain why companies keep target 
dividend payouts low enough to avoid having to make 
regular stock issues. It would also explain why a firm 
whose debt ratio climbs above target does not immediately 
issue stock, buy back debt, and re-establish a more 
moderate debt ratio. Thus, firms might take extended
excursions above their debt targets. However, the
out-of-pocket costs of repurchasing shares seem fairly
small. It is thus hard to explain extended excursions 
below a firms' debt target by an added static tradeoff 
theory. The firm could quickly issue debt and buy back 
shares. Moreover, if personal income taxes are important 
in explaining firm's apparent preferences of internal 
equity, then it's difficult to explain why external equity 
is not strongly negative that is why- according to Myers - 
why most firms haven't gradually move to materially lower 
target payout ratios and used the released cash to 
repurchase shares.
Timing of Security Issues
Firms apparently try to time stock issues when
security prices are high. Given that they seek external 
finance, they are more likely to issue stock rather than 
debt after stock processes have risen than after they have 
fallen. This fact is embarrassing to static tradeoff
18
advocates. If firm value rises, the debt ratio falls, and
firms ought to issue debt, not equity, to rebalance their
capital structures.
The fact is equally embarrassing to the pecking order
hypothesis. There is no reason to believe that the
manager's inside information is systematically more
favorable when stock prices are high. Even if there were
such a tendency, investors would have learned it by now,
and would interpret the firm's issue decision accordingly.
Myers confirmed "There is no way firms can systematically
take advantage of purchasers of new equity in rational
expectations equilibrium."
Borrowing against Intangibles and Growth 
Opportunities
Firms holding valuable intangible assets or growth 
opportunities tend to borrow less than firms holding 
mostly tangible assets. Myers stated that there is plenty 
of indirect evidence indicating that the level of 
borrowing is determined not just by the value and risk of 
the firm's assets, but also by the type of assets it 
holds. Without this distinction, the static tradeoff
theory would specify all target debt ratios in terms of 
market, not book values. Since many firms have market
values far in excess of book values- even if these book
19
values are restated in current dollars- we ought to see at 
least a few such firms operating comfortably at very high 
book debt ratios (Myers, 1984). The fact begins to make
sense as soon as we realize that book values reflect
assets-in-place, meaning tangible assets and working 
capital. Market values reflect intangibles and growth 
opportunities as well as assets-in-place. Thus, firms do 
not set target book debt ratios because accountants
certify the books. Book asset values are proxies for the 
values of assets in place.
Exchange Offers
The offers happen when a firm offers to exchange debt 
for equity or equity for debt. Masulis has shown that 
stock prices rise on average when a firm offers to 
exchange debt for equity and fall' when they offer to 
exchange equity for debt (Masulis, 1980). Myers explained 
this fact by various ways. For example, it might be a tax 
effect. If most firms' debt ratios are below their optimal 
ratios and if corporate interest tax shields have 
significant positive value, the debt for equity exchanges 
would tend to move firms closer to optimum capital 
structure. Equity-for-debt swaps would tend to move them 
farther away.
20
The evidence on exchanges hardly builds confidence in 
the static tradeoff theory as a description of financing 
behavior. If the theory were right, firms would be 
sometimes above and sometimes below their optimum ratios. 
Those above would offer to exchange equity for debt. Those 
below would offer debt for equity. In both cases, the firm 
would move closer to the optimum. Myers asked "Why should
an exchange offer be good news if in one direction and bad
news if in the other?"
As Masulis pointed out, the firm's willingness to 
exchange debt for equity might signal that the firm's debt 
capacity had, in the management's opinion, increased. That 
is, it would signal an increase in firm value or a
reduction in firm risk. As a result of the fact, a
debt-for-equity exchange would be good news, and the
opposite exchange bad news.
The idea that an exchange offer reveals a change in 
the firm's target debt ratio, and thereby signals changes 
in firm value or risk, sounds plausible. But an equally 
plausible story can be told without saying anything about 
a target debt ratio. If the manager with superior
information acts to maximize the intrinsic value of
existing shares, then the announcement of a stock issue 
should be bad news, other things equal, because stock
21
issues will be more likely when the manager receives bad
news. On the other hand, stock retirements should be good 
news. Myers points out that the news in both cases has no 
evident necessary connection with shifts in target debt
ratios.
It may be possible, according to Myers, to build a 
model combining asymmetric information with the costs and
benefits of borrowing emphasized in static tradeoff 
stories. However, it will prove difficult to do this 
without also introducing some elements of the pecking 
order theory.
Issue or Repurchase of Shares
This fact is obviously not a surprise given the 
previous one. On average, stock price falls when firms 
announce a stock issue. Stock prices rise, on average,
when a stock repurchase is announced. This fact has been 
confirmed in several studies including Vermaelen (1981) .
This fact is hard to explain by a static tradeoff 
model, except as an information effect in which stock 
issues or retirements signal changes in the firm's target
debt ratio.
The simple asymmetric information model Myers used to 
motivate the pecking order hypothesis does predict that 
the announcement of a stock issue will cause stock price
22
to fall. It also predicts that stock price should, not 
fall, other things equal, if default-risk debt is issued. 
Of course, a private company can issue debt that is 
absolutely protected from default, but it seems reasonable 
to predict that the average stock price impact of 
high-grade debt issues will he small relative to the 
average impact of stock issues (Dann & Mikkleson, 1983).
All these results pointed out in theory and 
researches by analysts and writers make us more 
comfortable with asymmetric information models of the kind
sketched above, and thus a bit more comfortable with the
pecking order story. Indeed, Myers points out that people 
feel comfortable with the static tradeoff story because it 
sounds plausible and yields an interior optimum debt 
ratio. It rationalizes moderate borrowing. Myers adds that
the story may be moderate and plausible, but that does not 
make it right. We have to ask whether it explains firm's 
financing behavior. If eventually, it does not, then we 
need a better theory before offering advice to managers.
In what follows, I will present a model of optimal 
capital structure presented by Michael Bradley, Gregg A. 
Jarrell and E. Han Kim in their article entitled "On the
Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and 
Evidence." The model synthesizes the current state of the
23
art in the theory of optimal capital structure. It
captures the essence of the
tax-advantage-and-bankruptcy-costs trade off models of 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), Kim (1978), 
and Titman (1984), the agency costs of debt arguments of
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Myers (1977) .
To develop a model that represents the current state
of the art in the theory of optimal capital structure, 
Bradley, Gregg, and Kim (1983) made the following 
assumptions:
a. Investors are risk-neutral.
b. Investors face a progressive tax rate on returns
from bonds, while the firm faces a constant
statutory marginal tax rate.
c. Corporate and personal taxes are based on
end-of-period wealth; consequently, debt 
payments (interest and principle) are fully 
deductible in calculating the firm's 
end-of-period tax bill, and are fully taxable at
the level of the individual bondholder.
d. Equity returns (equity and capital gains) are
taxed at a constant rate.
e. There exist non-debt tax shields, such as
accelerated depreciation and investment tax
24
credits, that reduce the firm's end-of-period
tax liability.
f. Negative tax bills (unused tax credits) are not 
transferable (saleable) either through time or
across firms.
g. The firm will incur various costs associated
with financial distress should it fail to meet
in full the end-of-period payment promised to
its bondholders.
h. The firm's end-of-period value before taxes and
debt payments is a random variable. If the firm 
fails to meet the debt obligation to its
bondholders, the costs associated with financial
distress will reduce the value of the firm by a
constant fraction.
The first assumption, that of risk neutrality, 
eliminates the need to model the general equilibrium issue
of the trade-off between the tax status and the
risk/expected return characteristic of debt and equity 
securities. In this context, risk-neutrality is equivalent 
to assuming that investors form either all-equity or 
all-debt portfolios depending on their tax rates.
Assumptions (b) through (d) describe the tax 
environment of the model. Assumption (d) relaxes the
25
undesirable assumption of a zero tax rate on income from
stocks that has been commonly used by authors.
Assumptions (e) and (f) are made to incorporate the 
effects of non-debt tax shields on the corporate leverage
decision. Assumption (f) prohibits firms from carrying tax
credits backward or forward, or from selling them via a
leasing agreement or through a merger.
Finally, assumptions (g) and (h) allow for the 
existence of costs associated with risky debt that are 
incurred when the firm encounters difficulty in meeting 
its end-of-period obligation to its debt holders.
To show that the net tax advantage of debt is 
positive with a constant-positive tax rate on equity 
returns, the analysts considered both the demand and 
supply of corporate debt and equity. In a risk neutral
world, affirmed the writers of the model, investors are 
indifferent between holding stocks and bonds as long as 
the expected after-tax returns are the same. On the 
corporate side, firms are indifferent between issuing 
stocks and bonds as long as the marginal expected 
after-tax cost of issuing debt is the same as the marginal 
expected cost of issuing equity.
The comparative static and the simulation of the 
model provide some testable implications. The debt ratio
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is inversely related to the costs of financial distress, 
which include bankruptcy costs.
This model synthesizes the modern balancing theory of 
optimal capital structure. It incorporates positive 
personal taxes on equity and on bond income, expected 
costs of financial distress (bankruptcy costs and agency 
costs), and positive non-debt tax shields. It shows that 
optimal firm leverage is related inversely to expected
costs of financial distress and to the amount of non-debt
tax shields. A simulation analysis demonstrates that if 
costs of financial distress are significant, optimal firm 
leverage is related inversely to the variability of firm 
earnings.
The Use of Debt in the 
Capital Structure
Before boarding into the usefulness of the bringing 
into play of debt in the capital structure and its worth 
to the firm, we have to define the management's first 
place goal: is it the maximization of the value of equity
or the value of the firm?
A good starting point for our analysis is the common 
misunderstanding that in order to optimize the firm's 
capital structure; managers should maximize the value of 
equity. For this sake, I used Ivo Welch's analysis and
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thoughts in examining this matter as expressed in his 
article "A Primer on Capital Structure" (1996) . Even 
though equity is a part of the firm's capital structure, 
there is also debt and many financial instruments with 
both debt and equity features that managers should take
into account. Welch states in his "A Primer on Capital
Structure" article (1996) that if an alternative capital
structure would lead to a higher value for the overall
firm (the sum of the values of all securities), the latter
would be a better capital structure.
To see the difference, Welch assumes there was a way
(known by everybody) in which managers could increase the 
value of equity by $1 if they could reduce the value of 
debt by $3 . This would reduce the value of the firm by $2. 
Managers are now faced with a dilemma: should they 
maximize the firm value, or should they maximize the value 
of equity, which after all votes managers into office and 
allows them to stay in office? Thus, managers may find it 
in their interest to do this exchange-even though this
lowers the value of the firm (i.e., the total value of all 
assets and projects, both current and future, which equals 
the total value of all financing instruments). Yet, note 
that today's (ex-ante) purchasers of debt will take into 
consideration the possible future (ex-post) loss in the
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value of their debt, and will rationally demand
compensation (an extra $3 discount) for the possibility of 
this transfer. If managers cannot commit not to undertake
the 3-for-l exchange, everyone will realize that ex-post
managers will like to do this when the time comes.
Therefore, managers today would either reduce the value of
the firm (equity) by $2, or have to forego issuing debt 
(as we will see later, debt in the capital structure could
have valuable tax benefits). Even if the firm does not 
need to raise debt today, if it could possibly become 
advantageous to raise debt in the future, the value of a
firm today with a management team unable to commit not to 
do the 3-for-l exchange would be lower. For example, if 
there is a 10% probability that the firm might want to 
raise debt next year, it would then have to reduce its
debt price by $3 and lose $2 in firm value. If investors 
are risk-neutral, with the 10% probability, the loss in 
firm value today of the firm's inability to commit itself
in the future is thus 20 cents.
The important insight is that the cost of ex-post
actions is born not only by bondholders tomorrow, but also 
by the owners today. Indeed, caveat emptor ("buyer 
beware") applies; bond and stock purchasers can only be
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hurt to the extent that future opportunistic actions by- 
management are unforeseen surprises.
Thus, it is in management's (owners') own interest 
today to commit not to exploit future owners and 
bondholders tomorrow-especially if every one knows that 
when the time comes, management would like to change its 
mind. Another important insight is that competition can 
force firms towards the best capital structure. When one
management team cannot commit not to do bad 3-for-l
exchanges and a firm with debt would be worth more than a
firm without debt, then another management team that can 
commit can bid for the right to take over the firm-up to 
the value that the firm is losing by not having debt. 
Again, in general, a line emphasized throughout Welch's 
article is that firms that can commit to do "the right
thing" tomorrow (ex-post) are worth more today (ex-ante). 
It is a direct consequence that firms that maximize firm 
value are worth more than firms that maximize equity
value.
Miller's famous "Debt and Taxes" paper (1977) cut us
loose from the extreme implications of the original Miller 
and Modigliani theory, which made interest tax shields so 
valuable that we cannot explain why all firms were not 
awash in debt (Meyers, 1983). Miller described an
30
equilibrium of an aggregate supply and demand for
corporate debt, in which personal income taxes paid by the 
marginal investor in corporate debt just offset the 
corporate tax saving. However, according to Myers, since 
the equilibrium only determines aggregates, debt policy
should not matter for any single tax paying firm. Thus, 
Miller's model allows us to explain the dispersion of 
actual debt policies without having to introduce 
non-value-maximizing managers (Meyers, 1983) .
The trouble is, according to Myers, this explanation
works only if we assume that all firms face approximately 
the same marginal tax rate, and that is an assumption we 
can immediately reject. The extensive trading of 
depreciation tax shields and investment tax credits, 
through financial leases and other devices, proves that 
plenty of firms face low marginal rates.
Myers stated that the literature on costs of 
financial distress supports two qualitative statements 
about financing behavior:
1. Risky firms ought to borrow less, other things 
equal. Here, "risk" would be defined as the
variance rate of the market value of the firm's
assets. The higher the variance rate, the 
greater the probability of default on any given
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package of debt claims. Since costs of financial 
distress are caused by threatened or actual 
default, safe firms ought to be able to borrow
more before expected costs of financial distress 
offset the tax advantages of borrowing.
2. Firms holding tangible assets-in-place having
active second-hand markets will borrow less than
firms holding specialized, intangible assets or 
valuable growth opportunities. The expected cost 
of financial distress depends not just on the
probability of trouble, but the value lost if 
trouble comes. Specialized, intangible assets or 
growth opportunities are more likely to lose
value in financial distress.
James H. Scott, Jr., in his article "Bankruptcy,
Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure," (1977) 
defends the issuance of secured debt and its ability to
increase to total value of a firm, even in absence of
corporate tax. First, according to Scott, "A debt contract 
is said to be secured if the borrower pledges an asset to
the lender with the provision that should the borrower 
default on his agreement the lender has the right the 
seize and sell the asset in question. Should the proceeds 
from the sale exceed the amount owed to the lender, the
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excess is returned to the borrower or his estate. If the
proceeds are insufficient, the lender retains all of the 
proceeds and becomes an unsecured creditor to the 
remainder due him. In general, upon bankruptcy the 
proceeds are distributed in the following order: secured 
creditors, priority creditors (administrators of the 
bankruptcy proceedings, tax collectors, certain wage
earners, etc.), unsecured creditors, stockholders."
Previous studies conducted by Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973), Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Stiglitz (1969)
have shown that in absence of tax, in frictionless markets 
where there is no possibility for the firm to go bankrupt, 
changes in its debt-equity ratio will not alter to total 
market value of its debt plus its equity. Stiglitz (1969) 
had shown that even if bankruptcy can occur, the
irrelevance of debt policy will follow if the individual 
investor is permitted to purchase equity on margin paying 
the same rate of interest as would the firm and using 
his/her equity as collateral for the debt. The investor's 
loan contract must also stipulate that the firm should go 
bankrupt, the investor need only surrender his/her equity 
to settle his/her margin debt (Stiglitz, 1969) .
However, in a more recent article entitled "Default
Risk, Scale, and the Homemade Leverage Theorem," (1972)
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Smith seems to disagree with the Stiglitz conclusion, 
arguing that a rational lender would demand a higher
interest rate of the individual than of the firm. However,
Stiglitz dealt with the effect of an increase in the 
amount of debt by a firm which initially had no debt and, 
given that situation, according to Scott, Stiglitz's 
reasoning is correct. On the other hand, if the firm 
originally has debt-the Smith situation-and, increases it, 
then a stronger condition is required for capital
structure irrelevancy.
More generally, Fama and Miller (1972) have argued
that if the capital market is what they call "perfect" 
then even if bankruptcy is possible, firms cannot alter 
the total market value of their outstanding securities by 
issuing or retiring any type of security. One of the 
conditions imposed by Fama and Miller is that securities 
be defined so that they are protected against financing 
actions by firms or by individuals, which would reduce the 
value of the securities without adequate compensation.
However, not all of the liabilities of a firm.are
protected in the Fama-Miller sense and as a result, Scott
argues, that the issuance of secured debt can increase the 
total market value of the firm. For example, he states 
that one of the hazards of engaging in commercial activity
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lies in the fact that a disgruntled customer, supplier, or 
injured party may file suit and win legal damages from the 
firm. Since there is always the possibility that the firm 
will be obliged to pay future legal damages, the present 
value of expected damages constitute a liability of the 
firm. By the issuance of secured debt, the firm can 
increase the value of its securities by reducing the 
amount available to pay legal damages in the event that 
the firm should go bankrupt. This follows since Baumol and 
Malkiel's article "The Firm's Optimal Debt Equity
Combination and the Cost of Capital," (1967) upon
bankruptcy the claim of a secured creditor to the assets 
pledged as security ranks ahead of claims for legal
damages, and potential victors in legal suits are unable 
to protect themselves from the issuance of secured debt
if, at the time of issuance, they do not yet have cause
for legal action. Other future costs not protected in the 
Fama-Miller sense include sales taxes, property taxes, 
excise taxes, and the administrative costs of bankruptcy. 
The issuance of secured debt can increase firm value by
reducing the probability that these costs will be paid.
To close up his statement, Scott proves by his model
that it is possible for the firm to go bankrupt, but also 
to raise funds in the capital market in an attempt
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(successful or not) to avoid bankruptcy. Valuation 
formulas were derived for equity, subordinated debt, and
secured debt, and it was demonstrated that a firm
following an optimal policy should issue as much secured
debt as possible. The maximum amount of secured interest
payments was shown to be an increasing function of the
size of the firm, and of both the mean and variance of its
earnings stream. On the other hand, increases in the
default free rate of interest decreased the maximum amount
of secured interest payments. Finally, Scott shows the 
effect of U.S. bankruptcy law on the ability of firms to 
issue the type of secured debt.
Stuart M. Turnbull, in his article "Debt Capacity," 
(1979) confirms the position taken by Modigliani and 
Miller vis-a-vis the use of debt in capital structure. 
Turnbull states that in a world with corporate taxation, 
where interest payments are tax deductible, it has long 
been recognized that the issuance of debt can enhance the
value of the firm. The existence of various market
imperfections, adds Turnbull, can off-set the advantages 
of debt, giving rise to the idea that there is a limit on
the amount of debt a firm should use and a limit on the
amount of debt the firm is allowed to use. The latter
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limit, according to Turnbull, has been termed the debt
capacity of the firm.
Finally, all this corporate finance literature over 
the past several decades shows in general the imperative 
usefulness of the employ of debt in capital structure. The
expression for the value of the levered firm can be used 
to determine to optimal method of financing an investment 
project, given the firm's capital structure. An
interesting result proved by Thomas E. Conine, Jr. in his 
article "Corporate Debt and Corporate Taxes: An
Extension," (1980) was that the correlation between the
return of a levered firm and the market portfolio, a 
primary input to the measurement of diversification 
relative to the market, can be influenced by the financing 
decision of the firm. That is, pure capital structure 
rearrangements directly affect the relative amount of 
diversifiable risk which investors are not compensated for 
an efficient market characterized by risk aversion.
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CHAPTER THREE
NECESSITY AND ADVANTAGE OF THE
USE OF DEBT IN THE CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
Inside versus Outside Debt
Eugene Fama, in the article "What's Different About 
Banks?," (1985) presents a distinction between inside and 
outside debt. Inside debt, according to this article, is
defined as a loan for which the lender has access to
information about the borrower that is not otherwise
publicly available. The lender, for example, may
contribute in the firm's decision-making process as a
member of the board of directors. Outside debt, on the
contrary, is a publicly-traded claim, for which the debt 
holder relies on publicly available information generated 
by bond rating agencies, independent audits, or analyst 
reports. Bank loans and privately places loans are
examples of inside debt, and publicly traded bonds and 
commercial paper are examples of outside debt..
Inside Debt, in addition, seems to be a chief source
of financing for smaller public corporations as well as 
privately held firms. As stated by Donald H. Chew, Jr. in 
"The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice,"
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(2001) bank loans represented some 46 percent of debt 
financing by U.S. (non financial) corporations between 
1977 and 1986. Private placements of bonds, which are 
essentially loan sales to a limited number of investors
accounted for about 30 percent of all bond issues over the
same period.
Using inside debt has several advantages as pointed 
out by Chew. First, inside debt may provide a possible 
solution to the information asymmetry problem that attends 
all public securities offerings. For example, to the
extent banks have better information about, and thus
greater confidence in, a given firm's future than
outsiders, they would price their loans to reflect this 
information advantage. For firms with strong relationships 
with local bankers, but no chance of gaining an investment 
grade bond rating- maybe just for a matter of size- the 
cost of a bank loan or private placement can be
significantly lower than the cost of borrowing through a 
public securities offering.
Second, added Chew, inside debt holders are in a
better position to monitor the firm after the debt is 
issued. Private placements and bank loans typically 
contain detailed restrictive covenants, often
custom-tailored to the specific problems and opportunities
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of the borrower. Renegotiating the credit in response to 
unexpected developments is much easier when there is only
one or several lenders then when there are several
hundreds or even thousands of anonymous investors. Also,
in the case of bank loans, firms may be able to lower
their debt costs by borrowing from banks with which they 
maintain a deposit relationship, because these banks
already have information useful for evaluating and
monitoring credit quality.
Third, Chew adds that there may be a benefit to 
maintaining confidentiality about the firm's investment 
opportunities. Companies may not wish to reveal to the 
public the information that lenders require. For example, 
if a firm is raising capital for some investment the value 
of which goes down if competitors learn about it prior to 
its introduction, borrowing from private parties or from 
insiders allows the firm to keep the investment secret 
until introduction in the right time.
Finally, the use of inside debt allows borrowers to 
avoid the costly and time-consuming process of registering 
issues with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It 
should be noted, however, that according to Chew, there 
are also costs to negotiating inside debt and while the 
fixed cost of public issues are relatively large, variable
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costs are small. For this reason, inside debt is more
likely to be used for smaller borrowings- that is, when
the size of the issues are not large enough to benefit
from the considerable economies of scale in floating new
public issues.
Chew mentioned also about the testable insinuation of
the hypothesis that bank loans and other types of private 
debt keep away from the negative signal associated with
the public offerings is that announcements of such inside
debt transactions will have a positive consequence on the 
stock prices of the borrowing firms. The loan approval 
process itself may convey positive information to market 
participants about the financial strength of the firm,
especially in the case of smaller firms without access to 
public capital markets. Loan renewals and new extensions 
may provide a credible seal of approval to equity 
investors and further claimants of the firm, who 
consequently need not undertake similar costly evaluations
of the firm's financial situation.
How Big is the Advantage of Debt
Tax Advantage
This section of the thesis explains the tax advantage 
of debt in the capital puzzle of corporations in US
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economy. The relationship between the tax advantage of a 
debt and annual rate of return advantage offered by 
optimal leverage may be too small to make a difference 
about the debt policy of the firms. In other words, the 
range of debt to firm value ratios is indifferent about 
the debt policy of the firms. However, the debt policy of 
the firms is the important determinant of the bankruptcy
costs.
According to Ross Stephen, the experimental range of 
debt-to-firm value ratios in the U.S. economy is from zero 
to 60 percent (Ross, 1977). There are financial models to
investigate the capital structure of the firms. Some of 
the those models pioneered by Turnbull in his article 
entitled "Debt Capacity," (1979) focused on the tradeoff 
between the tax shield and bankruptcy costs arising due to
the cost of debt and other models such as Ross (1977)
focused on information agency costs.
The issue of tax benefits of debt versus bankruptcy 
cost is controversial. According to Miller in the article 
"Debt and Taxes," (1977) the costs of bankruptcy are small 
relatively to the tax benefits of the debt. Miller argues 
this theory to explain the existence of unlevered firms.
On the other hand, DeAngelo and Masulis argue that the 
bankruptcy costs and the net tax advantage to debt should
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be in equilibrium in order to offset the marginal
bankruptcy. DeAngelo and Masulis defend every firm's need 
to structure its debt policy according to tax advantage
versus bankruptcy costs even if the bankruptcy costs are 
relatively small if compared to the tax advantage.
The United States taxes corporate income, but
interest is a tax-deductible expense. A taxpaying firm 
that pays an extra dollar of interest receives a partially 
offsetting "interest tax shield" in the form of lower 
taxes paid. Financing with debt instead of equity
increases the total after-tax dollar return to debt and
equity investors, and should increase firm value.
This present value of interest tax shields could be a 
very big number. Suppose debt is fixed and permanent, as 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) assumed, and that corporate 
income is taxed at a current 35 percent statutory rate.
The firm borrows $1 million and repurchases and retires $1 
million of equity. It commits itself to maintain this debt 
level and to make annual interest payments for the 
indefinite future. Absent taxes, this new debt does not 
increase or decrease firm value: the firm is borrowing on 
fair terms, so the money raised is exactly offset by the 
present value of the future interest payments. But for a 
taxpaying firm the net liability created by the $1 million
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debt issue is only $650,000, because, the Internal Revenue 
Service effectively pays 35 percent of the interest 
payments. The after-tax net present value of this
transaction would be NPV = + 1 - 0.65 = $0.35 million. The
gains from borrowing $10 million or $500 million scale up 
proportionally (Myers, 2001).
Myers points out that such calculations are now 
understood as remote upper bounds. First, the firm may not
always be profitable, so the average effective future tax 
rate is less than the statutory rate. Second, debt is not
permanent and fixed. Investors today cannot know the size
and duration of future interest tax shields. "Debt
capacity" depends on the future profitability and value of 
the firm. It may be able to increase borrowing if it does 
well, or be forced to pay down debt if it does poorly. The 
future interest tax shields flowing to investors are 
therefore risky (Myers, 2001).
Third, according to Myers, the corporate-level tax 
advantages of debt could be partly offset by the tax
advantage of equity to individual investors, namely, the 
ability to defer capital gains and then to pay taxes at a
lower capital gains rate. The tax rate on investors'
interest and dividend income is higher than the effective 
tax rate on equity income, which comes as a mixture of
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dividends and capital gains. Corporations should see this 
relatively low effective rate as a reduction in the cost 
of equity relative to the cost of debt.
The tax advantages of equity to investors could, in
some cases, offset the value of interest tax shields to 
the corporation. For example, suppose Firm X's 
shareholders are in the top individual tax bracket, paying 
about 40 percent on a marginal dollar of interest or
dividends received. However, the firm pays no dividends, 
so equity income comes entirely as capital gains. Suppose 
the effective rate on capital gains is about 8 percent. 
(The top-bracket capital gains rate is now 20 percent, and 
payment can be deferred until shares are sold and the 
gains realized). Then the total taxes paid on $100,000 of 
Firm X's income are: 1) $35,000 in corporate taxes, plus 
2) about $5,000 of (deferred) capital gains taxes (about 8 
percent of the after-tax corporate income of $65,000).
Now Firm X borrows $1 million at 10 percent and 
repurchases and retires $1 million of equity. It pays out 
$100,000 per year in interest but saves $35,000 in taxes.
But investors receive $100,000 more in interest income and 
$65,000 less in capital gains. Their taxes go up by 
$40,000 - 5,000 = $35,000. There is no net gain once both 
corporate and individual taxes are considered.
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Myers states that if these effective tax rates
applied generally to the marginal investors in debt and 
equity securities, we would predict the equilibrium
"described by Miller (1977) .
The equilibrium is reached in the following way. As 
the supply of debt from all corporations expands, 
investors with higher and higher tax brackets have to be 
enticed to hold corporate debt, and to receive more of 
their income in the form of interest rather than capital 
gains. Interest rates rise as more and more debt is 
issued. So corporations face rising costs of debt relative 
to their costs of equity.
Eventually the after-tax cost of debt becomes so high 
that there is no gain from further borrowing. The supply
of debt increases until there is no further net tax
advantage. At that point, the effects of personal and 
corporate taxes cancel out, and Modigliani and Miller's 
Proposition 1 holds despite the tax-deductibility of 
interest (Myers, 2001).
But actual tax rates do not appear to support this 
equilibrium. Graham (2000) examines the interest rate 
spread between corporate bonds and tax-exempt municipal 
bonds to estimate the tax rate paid by marginal investors 
in corporate debt.
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The rate is about 30 percent, well below the top
bracket. He also estimates the effective tax rate on
equity income at about 12 percent. Assume again that Firm
X borrows $1 million and pays out $100,000 of interest 
yearly. It saves $35,000 in taxes. The marginal investor 
in debt pays an extra $30,000 on interest income but saves 
about $8,000 on equity income (about 12 percent of 
$65,000). The net tax saving is $35,000 - (30,000 -
8,000) = $13,000. Thus the extra tax paid by investors 
offsets more than half of the corporate interest tax
shield. Nevertheless, interest tax shields should still be
extremely valuable.
Graham's (2000) estimates are not definitive. We are
not sure who the relevant marginal investors are; much 
less their effective tax rates (Myers, 2001). Yet, there 
is a near consensus, among both practitioners and 
economists, that there is a significant tax incentive for 
corporate borrowing. Therefore, we should observe
corporations borrowing to exploit interest tax shields. If 
there were no offsetting costs, they would attempt to 
shield as much taxable income as possible, and in 
equilibrium there would be no corporations paying taxes! 
According to Myers, "This prediction is clearly wrong."
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There must be some costs attached to aggressive 
borrowing. This leads to the tradeoff theory of capital
structure.
Taxes and the Tradeoff Theory. The tradeoff theory
justifies moderate debt ratios. It says that the firm will
borrow up to the point where the marginal value of tax
shields on additional debt is just offset by the increase 
in the present value of possible costs of financial
distress (Myers, 2001). Financial distress refers to the 
costs of bankruptcy or reorganization, and also to the
agency costs that arise when the firm's creditworthiness
is in doubt. For now, just assume that costs of financial 
distress exist, and that the prospect of financial
distress can drag down the current market value of the
firm.
The tradeoff theory is in immediate trouble on the
tax front because it seems to rule out conservative debt
ratios by taxpaying firms. If the theory is right, a 
value-maximizing firm should never pass up interest tax 
shields when the probability of financial distress is 
remotely low. Yet there are many established profitable 
companies with superior credit ratings operating for years 
at low debt ratios, including Microsoft and the major 
pharmaceutical companies (Myers, 2001).
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These examples are not unusual. About half the firms 
in Graham's (2000) sample were paying taxes at the full 
statutory rate; the average firm in this sub sample could 
have doubled its interest payments in confident 
expectation of doubled interest tax shields. Graham (1996) 
estimates that these companies could have added 7.5 
percent on average to firm value by "levering up" to 
still-conservative debt ratios. This is not small change.
A 7.5 percent deviation from Modigliani and Miller's 
(1958) leverage-irrelevance proposition should prompt a 
vigorous supply response from security issuers. One cannot 
accept Modigliani and Miller's proposition and at the same 
time ignore many mature corporations' evident lack of 
interest in the tax advantages of debt (Myers, 2001).
Studies of the determinants of actual debt ratios
consistently find that the most profitable companies in a 
given industry tend to borrow the least. For example, Wald 
(1999) found that profitability was "the single largest 
determinant of debt/asset ratios" in cross-sectional tests 
for the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France and
Japan.
High profits mean low debt, and vice versa. But if 
managers can exploit valuable interest tax shields, as the 
tradeoff theory predicts, we should observe exactly the
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opposite relationship. High profitability means that the 
firm has more taxable income to shield, and that the firm
can service more debt without risking financial distress.
The tradeoff theory cannot account for the
correlation between high profitability and low debt 
ratios. It does no good to say (without further 
explanation) that managers are "excessively conservative" 
or "not value-maximizing." That amounts to blaming
managers, rather than economists, for the failure of the
economists' theory. Also, Myers adds that an examination 
of financing tactics quickly dismisses the idea that 
managers don't pay attention to taxes.
Floating-rate preferred shares are creatures of the 
tax code, and a clear illustration of the importance of 
taxes in financing tactics (Myers, 2001). These preferred 
dividend payments are tied to short-term interest rates. 
This stabilizes the preferred dividends' prices. They are 
purchased by other corporations with excess cash available 
for short-term investment. The key tax advantage is that 
only 30 percent of inter-corporate dividends are taxed
(Myers, 2001) . The effective corporate tax rate for 
preferred dividends is therefore 0.3 x 0.35 = 0.105 or
10.5 percent. The financial innovators who first created 
floating-rate preferred shares thus created a partially
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tax-exempt security that acted like a safe, short-term, 
money-market instrument.
Financial leases are also largely tax-driven. When 
the lessor's tax rate is higher than the lessee's, there
is a net gain because the lessor's interest and
depreciation tax shields are front-loaded. That is, they 
are mostly realized earlier than the taxes paid on the 
lease payments. The tax advantage is due to the time value 
of money, and therefore increases in periods of high 
inflation and high nominal interest rates (Myers, Dill, &
Bautista, 1977).
There are many further examples of tax-driven
financing tactics. Finding clear evidence that taxes have 
a systematic effect on financing strategy, as reflected in
actual or target debt ratios, is much more difficult. In
Myers (1984, p. 588), after a review of the then-available 
empirical work, the writer concluded that there was "no 
study clearly demonstrating that a firm's tax status has a 
predictable, material effect on its debt policy. I think 
that the wait for such a study will be protracted."
A few such studies have since appeared although some 
relate in part to financing tactics and none gives 
conclusive support for the tradeoff theory. For example, 
MacKie-Mason (1990) estimated a probity model for
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companies issuing debt or equity securities. He predicted 
that companies with low marginal tax rates—for example 
companies with tax loss carry-forwards—would be more 
likely to issue equity, compared to more profitable
companies facing the full statutory tax rate. This was 
clearly true in his sample.
MacKie-Mason's (1990) result is consistent with the
tradeoff theory, because it shows that taxpaying firms
favor debt. But it is also consistent with Miller's (1977)
equilibrium in which the value of corporate interest tax 
shields is entirely offset by the low effective tax rate 
on capital gains. In this case, a firm facing a low enough 
tax rate would also use equity, because investors pay more 
taxes on debt interest than on equity income. Thus, we
cannot conclude from MacKie-Mason's results that interest
tax shields make a significant contribution to the market 
value of the firm or that debt ratios are determined by 
the tradeoff theory (Myers, 2001).
Graham (1996) also finds evidence that changes in 
long-term debt are positively and significantly related to 
the firm's effective marginal tax rate. Again this.shows 
that taxes affect financing decisions, at least at the 
tactical level. It does not show that the present value of 
interest tax shields is materially positive. Myers states
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that Fama and French (1998), despite an extensive
statistical search, could find no evidence that interest
tax shields contributed to the market value of the firm.
The tradeoff theory of optimal capital structure has
strong commonsense appeal. It rationalizes moderate debt
ratios. It is consistent with certain obvious facts, for
example, companies with relatively safe tangible assets 
tend to borrow more than companies with risky intangible 
assets (high business risk increases the odds of financial 
distress, and intangible assets are more likely to sustain 
damage if financial distress is encountered.) However, as
Myers affirms, "the words "consistent with" are
particularly dangerous in this branch of empirical
financial economics." He adds that a fact or statistical 
finding is often consistent with two or more competing 
capital structure theories. It is too easy to interpret 
results as supporting the theory that one is used to.
The Evidence on Taxes. Theoretical models of optimal 
capital structure predict that firms with more taxable 
income and fewer non-debt tax shields should have higher 
leverage ratios (Barclay & Smith, 1999). But the evidence 
on the relation between leverage ratios and tax-related 
variables is mixed at best. For example, studies that 
examine the effect of non-debt tax shields on companies'
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leverage ratios find that this effect is either
insignificant, or that it enters with the wrong sign 
(Barclay & Smith, 1999). That is, in contrast to the 
prediction of the tax hypothesis, these studies suggest
that firms with more non debt tax shields such as
depreciation, net operating loss carry forwards and 
investment tax credits have, if anything, more, not less 
debt in their capital structures.
Barclay and Smith (1999) stressed out that before we
conclude that taxes are unimportant in the capital
structure decision, it is critical to recognize that the 
findings of these studies are hard to interpret because 
the tax variables are crude proxies for a company's 
effective marginal tax rate. In fact, these proxies are
often correlated with other variables that influence the
capital structure choice. For example, companies with 
investment tax credits, high levels of depreciation, and 
other non-debt tax shields also tend to have mainly 
tangible fixed assets. And, since fixed assets provide 
good collateral, the non-debt tax shields may in fact be a
proxy not for limited tax benefits, but rather for low 
contracting costs associated with debt financing (Barclay 
& Smith, 1999). The evidence from the studies just cited 
is generally consistent with this interpretation.
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Similarly, firms with net operating loss carry
forwards are often in financial distress; and, since
equity values typically decline in such circumstances, 
financial distress itself causes leverage ratios to
increase. Thus, again, it is not clear whether net
operating losses proxy for low tax benefits of debt or for
financial distress.
More recently, several authors have succeeded in 
detecting tax effects in financing decisions by focusing 
on incremental financing choices (that is, changes in the 
amount of debt or equity) rather than on the levels of 
debt and equity. For example, the 1990 study by Jeffery 
Mackie-Mason examined registered security offerings by 
public U.S. corporations and found that firms were more 
likely to issue debt if they had a high marginal tax rate 
and to issue equity if they had a low tax rate. In another 
attempt to avoid the difficulties with crude proxy 
variables, the 1996 study by John Graham used a
sophisticated simulation method to provide a more accurate 
measure of companies' marginal tax rates. Using such tax
rates, Graham also found a positive association between 
changes in debt ratios and the firm's marginal tax rate.
On balance, then, the evidence appears to suggest 
that taxes play at least a modest role in corporate
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financing and capital structure decisions. Moreover, as 
will be mentioned in the coming section of other 
advantages of the use of debt in capital structure, the 
results of the tests of contracting costs reported above 
can also be interpreted as evidence in support of tax 
explanation.
Other Advantages
Myers (1984), based in part on the argument in Myers 
and Majluf (1984), introduces the pecking order theory of 
capital structure. The major prediction of the model is 
that firms will not have a target or optimal capital 
structure, but will instead follow a pecking order of 
incremental financing choices that places internally 
generated funds at the top of the order, followed by debt 
issues, and finally, only when the firm reaches its "debt 
capacity," it will use new equity financing. This theory 
is based upon costs derived from asymmetric information 
between managers and the market and the idea that tradeoff 
theory costs and benefits to debt financing are of second 
order importance when compared to the costs of issuing new 
securities. The development of a pecking order based upon 
costs of adverse selection requires an ad hoc
specification of the manager's incentive and a limitation 
on the types of financing strategies that may be pursued.
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Despite these theoretical criticisms, the pecking order 
theory remains one of the predominant theories of the 
incremental financing choice (Myers, 1984).
Contracting Costs. Conventional capital structure 
analysis holds the financial managers set leverage targets 
by balancing the tax benefits of higher leverage against 
the grater probability, and thus higher expected costs, of 
financial distress. In this view, the optimal capital
structure is the one in which the next dollar in debt is
expected to provide an additional tax subsidy that just 
offsets the resulting increase in expected costs of
financial distress.
Costs of Financial Distress. Although the direct 
expenses associated with the administration and the 
bankruptcy processes appear to be quite small relative to 
the market values of companies, the indirect costs can be 
substantial (Barclay & Smith, 1999). In thinking about 
optimal capital structure, the most important indirect 
costs are likely to be the reductions in firm value that 
result from cutbacks in promising investment that tend to 
be made when companies get into financial difficulty.
When a company files for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy 
judge effectively assumes control of corporate investment 
policy-and it is not hard to imagine the circumstances in
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which judges do not maximize firm value. But even in 
conditions less extreme than bankruptcy, highly leveraged 
companies are more likely that their low-debt .counterparts 
to pass up valuable investment opportunities, especially 
when faced with the prospect of default. In such cases, 
corporate managers are likely not only to postpone major
capital projects, but to make cutbacks in R & D,
maintenance, advertising, or training that end up reducing 
future profits.
This tendency of companies to under-invest when 
facing financial difficulty is attenuated by conflicts 
that can arise among the firm's different claimholders. To
illustrate this conflict, Barclay and Smith (1999)
considered what might happen to a high-growth company that 
had trouble servicing its debt. Since the value of such a 
firm will depend heavily on its ability to carry out its 
long-term investment plan, what the company needs is an 
infusion of equity. But there is a problem. As Stewart 
Myers points out in his classic 1977 article entitled
"Determinants of Corporate Borrowing," the investors who 
would be asked to provide the new equity in such cases 
recognize that much of the value created (or preserved) by 
their investment would go to restoring the creditors' 
position. In this situation, the cost of the new equity
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could be so high that managers acting on their
shareholders' behalf might rationally forgo both the 
capital and the investment opportunities.
Myers refers to this as "the underinvestment 
problem." And as he still argues, companies whose value 
consists primarily of intangible investment opportunities- 
or "growth opting," as he called them- will choose low 
debt capital structures because such firms are likely to
suffer the greatest loss in value from this
underinvestment problem. By contrast, mature companies 
with few profitable investment opportunities where most of 
their value reflects the cash flows from tangible "assets 
in place" incur lower expected costs associated with 
financial distress. Such mature companies, all else equal, 
should have significantly higher leverage ratios than 
high-growth firms.
The Benefits of Debt in Controlling Overinvestment.
If too much debt financing can create an underinvestment
problem for growth companies, too little debt can lead to
an over-investment problem in the case of mature
companies. As Michael Jensen has argued, large, mature 
public companies generate substantial free cash flow- that 
is, operating cash flow that cannot be profitably
reinvested inside the firm. The natural inclination of
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corporate managers is to use such free cash flow to 
sustain growth at the expense of profitability, either by 
over investing in their core businesses or, perhaps worse, 
by diversifying through acquisition into unfamiliar ones.
Because both of these strategies tend to reduce
value, companies that aim to maximize firm value must
distribute their free cash flow to investors. Raising the
dividend is one way of promising to distribute excess 
capital. But major substitutions of debt to equity offer a 
more reliable solution because contractually obligated 
payments of interest and principal are more effective than
discretionary dividend payments in squeezing our excess 
capital. Thus, in industries generating substantial cash 
flow but facing few growth opportunities, debt financing 
can add value simply by forcing managers to be more 
critical in evaluating capital spending plans (Barclay &
Smith, 1999).
Evidence on Contracting Costs. Much of the evidence 
on capital structure supports the conclusion that there is 
an optimal capital structure and that firms make financing 
decisions and adjust their capital structures to move 
closer to the optimum (Barclay & Smith, 1999).
For example, some studies have used cross-sectional 
regression techniques to test whether the theoretical
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determinants of an optimal capital structure actually 
affect financing decisions. For example, in their 1984 
study, Michael Bradley, Gregg Jarrell, and Han Kim found 
that the debt to (book) asset ratio was negatively related 
to both the volatility of annual operating earnings and to 
advertising and R&D expenses. Both of these findings are
consistent with high costs of financial distress for
growth companies which tend to have more volatile earnings 
as well as higher spending on R&D.
According to Barclay and Smith (1999), when firms get 
into financial difficulty, complicated capital structures 
with claims of different priorities can generate serious 
conflicts among creditors, thus .exacerbating the
underinvestment problem described earlier. And because 
such conflicts and the resulting underinvestment have the 
greatest potential to destroy value in growth firms, those 
growth firms that do issue fixed claims are likely to 
choose mainly high-priority fixed claims.
Information Costs. Corporate executives often have 
better information about the real value of their companies 
than outside investors. Recognition of this information 
disparity between managers and investors has led to two
distinct but related theories of financing decisions- one 
known as signaling, the other as the pecking order.
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Signaling. With better information about the value of 
their companies than outside investors, managers of 
undervalued firms would like to raise their share prices
by communicating this information to the market.
Unfortunately, according to Barclay and Smith (1999), this 
task is not as easy as it sounds; simply announcing that 
the companies are undervalued is generally not enough. The 
challenge for managers is to find a credible signaling
mechanism.
Economic theory suggests that information disclosed 
by an obviously biased source (like management, in this 
case) will be credible only if the costs of communicating 
falsely are large enough to constrain managers to reveal 
the truth. Increasing leverage has been suggested as one 
potentially effective signaling device (Barclay & Smith, 
1999). Debt contracts oblige the firm to make a fixed set 
of cash payments over the life of the loan; if these 
payments are missed, there are potentially serious 
consequences, including bankruptcy. Equity is more 
forgiving (Barclay & Smith, 1999). Although stockholders 
also expect cash payouts, managers have more discretion 
over these payments and can cut or omit them in times of
financial distress.
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For this reason, adding more debt to the firm's 
capital structure can serve as a credible signal of higher 
future cash flows. By committing the firm to make future 
interest payments to bondholders, managers communicate
their confidence that the firm will have sufficient cash
flows to meet these obligations.
Debt and equity also differ with respect to their 
sensitivity to changes in firm value. Since the promised 
payments to bondholders are fixed, and stockholders are
entitled to the residual (or what's left over after the
fixed payments), stock prices are much more sensitive than 
bond prices to any proprietary information about future 
prospects (Barclay & Smith, 1999). If management is in 
possession of good news that has yet to be reflected in 
market prices, the release of such news will cause a 
larger increase in stock prices than in bond prices; and 
hence current stock prices (prior to the release of the 
new information) will appear more undervalued to managers 
than current bond prices. For this reason, signaling 
theory suggests that managers of companies that believe 
their assets are undervalued will generally choose to 
issue debt- and to use equity only as a last resort.
To illustrate this with a simple example, let's 
suppose that the market price of a stock is $10.00.
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Investors understand that its real value-that is, the
value they would assign if they had access to the same
information as the firm's managers- might be as high as
$12.00 or as low as $8.00; but given the investors'
available information, $10.00 is a fair price. Now let's
suppose that the managers want to raise external funds and 
they could either sell equity or debt. If the managers 
think the stock is really worth only $8.00, selling shares 
for $10.00 will be attractive- especially if their 
compensation is tied to stock appreciation. But if the 
managers think the stock is really worth $12.00, equity 
would be expensive at $10.00 and debt would be more
attractive.
The investors understand this and so if the company 
announces an equity offer, investors reassess the current
price in the light of this new information. Since it is 
more likely that the stock is worth $8.00 than $12.00, the 
market price declines. Such a rapid adjustment in
valuation associated with the announcement thus eliminates
much of any potential gain from attempting to exploit the 
manager's superior information.
Consistent with this example, many economists have 
documented that the market responds in systematically 
negative fashion to announcements of equity offerings,
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marking down the share prices of issuing firms to a new 
equilibrium price. By contrast, the average market 
reaction to new debt offerings is not significantly 
different from zero. The important thing to recognize is 
that most companies issuing new equity - those that are
undervalued as well as those that are overvalued - can
expect a drop in stock prices when they announce the 
offering (Barclay & Smith, 1999). For those firms that are 
fairly valued or undervalued prior to the announcement of 
the offering, this expected drop in value represents an 
economic strength of the existing shareholders' interest.
The Pecking Order. The signaling theory, then, says 
that the financing decisions are based, at least in part, 
on management's perception of the fairness of the market's 
current valuation of the stock. Stated as simply as 
possible, the theory suggests that in order to minimize 
the information costs of issuing securities, a company is 
more likely to issue debt than equity if the firm appears 
undervalued, and to issue equity stock rather than debt if
the firm seems overvalued.
The pecking order theory takes this argument one step 
further. According to Barclay and Smith (1999), this
theory suggests that the information costs associated with 
issuing securities are so large that they dominate all
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other considerations. According to this theory, the 
companies maximize value by systematically choosing to 
finance new investments with the cheapest available source 
of funds. Specifically, they prefer debt to equity because
of the lower information costs associated with debt
issues. Companies issue equity only as a last resort, when
their debt capacity has been exhausted.
Barclay and Smith (1999) stressed out that the 
pecking order theory would thus suggest that companies
with few investment opportunities and substantial free 
cash flow will have low debt ratio and that high-growth 
firms with lower operating cash flows will have high debt 
ratios. Consequently, the theory suggests that interest
tax shields and the cost of financial distress are at most
a second-order concern; in addition, the logic of the
pecking order actually leads to a set of forecasts that
are accurately the opposite of those offered by the tax 
and contracting cost arguments obtainable above.
The Evidence on Information Costs. The signaling 
theory says that companies are more likely to issue debt 
then equity when they are undervalued because of the large 
information costs (in the form of dilution) associated 
with the equity offering. The pecking order model goes 
even further, suggesting that the information costs
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associated with riskier securities are so large that most 
companies will not issue equity until they have completely 
exhausted their debt capacity. Neither the signaling 
theory nor the pecking order offers any clear prediction 
about what optional capital structure would be for a given 
firm (Barclay & Smith, 1999). The signaling theory seems 
to suggest that a firm's actual capital structure will be 
influenced by whether the company is perceived by
management to be undervalued or overvalued. Barclay and 
Smith affirmed that the pecking order is even more
extreme: it implies that a company will not have a target 
capital structure, and that its leverage ratio will be 
determined by the gap between its operating cash flow and 
its investment requirements over time. Thus, the pecking 
order predicts that companies with consistently high 
profits or modest financing requirements are likely to 
have low debt ratios-mainly because they do not need 
outside capital. Less profitable companies, on the other 
hand, and those with large financing requirements, will 
end up with high leverage ratios because of the managers' 
reluctance to issue equity.
A number of studies provide support to the pecking 
order theory in the form of evidence of a strong negative 
correlation coefficient between past probability and
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leverage. That is, the lower a company's profits and 
operating cash flows in a given year are, the higher its 
leverage ratio is (Barclay & Smith, 1999). Moreover, in an 
article published in 1998, Myers and Lakshmi added to this 
series of studies by showing that this relation explains
more of the time-series variance of debt ratios than a
simple target-adjustment model of capital structure that 
is consistent with the contracting cost hypothesis.
Such findings have generally been interpreted as 
confirmation that managers do not set target leverage 
ratios-or at least do not work very hard to achieve them 
(Barclay & Smith, 1999). But this is not the only 
interpretation that fits this data. Even if companies have 
target leverage ratios, there will be an optimal deviation 
from those targets: one that will depend on the 
transactions costs associated with adjusting back to the 
target relative to the costs of deviating from the target.
To the extent there are fixed costs and scale economies in
issuing securities, companies with capital structure 
targets-particularly smaller firms- will make infrequent 




The signaling theory implies that undervalued firms
have more short-term debt and more senior debt than
undervalued firms because such instruments are less
sensitive to the market's assessment of firm value and
thus will be less undervalued when issued. The findings of 
Barclay and Smith's (1999) study are inconsistent with the 
predictions of the signaling hypothesis with respect to 
debt maturity. In fact, companies whose earnings were 
about to increase the following year issued less
short-term debt and more long-term debt than firms whose 
earnings were about to decrease. And, whereas the theory 
predicts more senior debt for firms about to experience 
earnings increases, the ratio of senior debt to total debt
is lower for overvalued than for undervalued firms.
In the sum, the results of Barclay and Smith's (1999) 
tests of managers' use of financing choices to signal 
their superior information to the market are not robust, 
and the economic effect of any such signaling on corporate 
decision making seems minimal.
According to the pecking order theory, the firm 
should issue as much of the security with the lowest 
information costs as it can. Only after this capacity is 
exhausted should it move on the issue of security with
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higher information costs. Thus, for example, firms should 
issue as much secured debt or capitalized leases as 
possible before issuing any unsecured debt, and they 
should exhaust their capacity for issuing short-term debt 
before issuing any long-term debt. But these predictions
are clearly rejected by the data. For example, Barclay and
Smith (1999) examined the capital structures of over 7,000 
companies between 1980 and 1977 (representing almost 
57,000 firm-year observations), they found that 23% of 
these observations had no secured debt, 54% had no capital 
leases, and 50% had no debt that was originally issued 
with less than one year to maturity.
To explain these more detailed aspects of capital 
structure, proponents of the pecking order theory must go 
outside their theory and argue that other costs and 
benefits determine their choices. But according to Barclay 
and Smith (1999), once you allow for these other costs and 
benefits to have a material impact on corporate financing 
choices, you are back in the more "traditional domain" of
optimal capital structure theories.
The Role of Bank Loans Raising Capital 
and Optimizing Capital Structure
In a frictionless capital market, firms are always 
able to secure funding for positive NPV projects. In the
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presence of information asymmetry in which the firm's 
quality and the quality of its investment projects cannot 
be easily evaluated by the outside capital markets, firms 
may be unable to raise sufficient capital to fund all of 
their good projects. Such market frictions create the 
possibility for differentiated markets or institutions to
arise (Faulkender & Petersen, 2002) . Financial
intermediaries are lenders that specialize in collecting
information about borrowers, a collection which is then 
used in the credit approval decision. By interacting with 
borrowers over time and across different products, the
banker may be able to partially alleviate the information
asymmetry which is the cause of the market's failure
(Faulkender & Petersen, 2002) .
Financial intermediaries such as banks may also have 
an advantage over arms length lenders (such as bond 
markets) after the capital is provided. If ex-post 
monitoring raises the probability of success (either 
through enforcing efficient project choice or enforcing 
the expenditure of the owner's effort), then they may be a 
preferred source of capital. Financial intermediaries may 
also be better at efficient restructuring of firms which 
are in financial distress (Faulkender & Petersen, 2002) .
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The literature has often described banks (or private
lenders) as being particularly good at investigating 
informational opaque firms and deciding which are viable 
borrowers. This suggests that the source of the capital 
may be intimately related to the firms' ability to access 
debt markets. Firms which are opaque (and thus difficult 
to investigate ex-ante) or which have more discretion in
their investment opportunities (and thus difficult for 
lenders to constrain contractually) are more likely to 
borrow from active lenders and are also the type of firms 
which theory predicts may be constrained. In this paper, I 
am concerned about investigating the link between where 
firms obtain their capital (the private versus the public
debt markets) and the contribution of the debt in the
capital. I am going to briefly describe the tradeoff 
between financial intermediaries (the private debt 
markets) which have an advantage at collecting information 
and restructuring firms, but are a potentially more 
expensive source of capital, and arm's length lenders (the 
public debt markets). The higher cost of capital may be 
due to the expenditure on monitoring or because of the tax 
disadvantage of the lender's organizational form. 
Additionally, not all firms may be able to choose the 
source of their debt capital. If firms which do not have
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access to the public debt markets are constrained by 
lenders in the amount of debt capital they may raise, we
should see this in their lower debt ratios.
Debt ratios should depend upon firm characteristics
as well. Thus a difference in leverage does not imply that 
firms are constrained by the debt markets. This difference
could be the product of firms with different
characteristics optimally making different decisions about 
leverage. This, however, does not appear to be the case. 
Even after controlling the firm characteristics which, as 
theory and previous empirical work argue, determine a 
firm's choice of leverage, we still find that firms with 
access to the public debt market have higher leverage that 
is both economically and statistically significant 
(Faulkender & Petersen, 2002). Finally, we consider the 
possibility that the choice of whether to gain access to 
the public debt markets (obtain a debt rating) is 
endogenous. Even after controlling the endogeneity of a 
debt rating, we find that firms with access to the public 
debt markets have significantly higher leverage ratios
(Faulkender & Petersen, 2002) .
This intuition is the basis of the empirical
literature which has examined the firm's choice of lender.
Firms that are riskier, smaller and about which less is
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known are the firms most likely to borrow from financial 
intermediaries. Larger firms about which much is known 
will be more likely to borrow from public capital markets
(Faulkender & Petersen, 2002).
The monitoring done by financial intermediaries and
the resources spent on restructuring firms, however, is
costly (Faulkender & Petersen, 2002). Its cost must 
therefore be passed back to the firm and this means that 
the cost of the capital for firms in this imperfect market 
depends not only on the risk of their projects but also on 
the resources needed to verify the viability of their 
projects. If monitoring is costly and imperfect, and if we 
compare two firms with identical projects, we will find 
that the one which needs to be monitored (for example if 
the owner does not have a track record), will have a 
different cost of (debt) capital. The cost of monitoring 
will be passed on to the borrower in the form of higher
interest rates. This will cause the firm to reduce its use
of debt capital. In addition, if the monitoring and 
additional information collection performed by the 
financial intermediary cannot eliminate the information 
asymmetry completely, credit may still be allowed.
To sum up the role and necessity of the use of debt 
in the capital structure, I developed a numerical example
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explaining the different processes in capital structure 
puzzle. I got inspired from class notes in corporate 
finance and summarized all the steps I already mentioned 
through the literature I presented above.
The question I am going to answer is: does capital
structure matter?
A firm consists of assets which produce a stream of
cash flows. The capital structure decision determines how
those assets will be paid for, and thus how the cash flows 
will be allocated among different claims (debt, equity, 
etc.). From this point, an important question derives: Can 
the firm increase the value of its assets by issuing a 
particular set of securities?
We first isolate the capital structure decision by 
holding investment and dividend policy fixed; Modigliani 
and Miller's (MM's) Proposition I states that in perfect 
markets, the value of a firm's assets is unaffected by the 
mix of securities used to finance the purchase of the
assets.
The proof relies on the fact that investors can do 
(or undo) any actions that firms can take.
Suppose that two firms have the same assets (that 
generate the same operating earnings), and differ only in
how the assets are financed:
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Firm U is unlevered (no debt) and so its assets and 
equity are both worth the same amount (Vu= Su = $100,000)
Firm L is levered (uses debt - say $25,000) and so the 
value of the equity is equal to: SL = VL - BL = VL - $25,000.
Consider two different investments:
1. buy 15% of firm U' s stock












Figure 1. Investment/Return Chart for Investments 1 and 2
Both investments offer the same return (and have the
same risk), and so must sell for the same price today.
Thus 0.15 Vu = 0.15 VL, or Vu = VL = $100,000. The levered
and unlevered firms are worth the same.
Now consider the following investments:
3. Buy 15% of firm 1/ s stock
4. Borrow $0.15 BL = $3,750, and buy 15% of firm












Figure 2. Investment/Return Chart for Investments 3 and 4
Again, both investments offer the same payoff, and 
therefore must sell for the same price today. This says
that 0.15 (VL - Bl) = 0.15 (Vo - BL) , or VL = Vo. The value
of the levered firm is the same as the unlevered firm.
In both cases, the irrelevance of capital structure 
depended on investors' ability to undo any effects of the 
differences in capital structure. In particular, investors
must be able to borrow or lend on the same terms as the
firm.
Some Restatements of Modigliani and Miller
Proposition I
1. If shares of levered firms are priced too high, 
investors will borrow by themselves and use the 
money to buy shares in unlevered firms. This is 
sometimes called homemade leverage.
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2. If shares of unlevered firms are too high, 
investors will buy shares in levered firms and 
put money in bonds.
3. In order for capital structure to matter, there 
must be some market imperfections that allow the 
firm to do something that investors cannot do
for themselves.
A counter-argument to Modigliani and Miller I?
Individuals cannot borrow as easily and cheaply as firms.
Wouldn't investors be willing to pay a premium for
investment 3 (firm L's equity?).
Answer. Market imperfections are a necessary, but not 
a sufficient, condition for capital structure to matter.
There must be an unsatisfied clientele for shares in
levered firms. There are a zillion levered firms available
to invest in. How could a firm increase its value by 
becoming the zillion-and-first?
Another Restatement of Modigliani and Miller I
Capital structure matters when firms find an untapped 
demand among investors and satisfy it with a new security. 
In a competitive market for securities your firm is 




The expected return on a portfolio is the weighted 
average of the expected returns of its component 
securities (weighted average cost of capital) :
r0 = (B/V) rB + (S/V) rs => rs = r0 + (B/S) (r0 - rB )
rWACC = r0
Since portfolio betas are also weighted averages of 
component betas we can also write:
ps = Po + (B/S) (po - PB)
An aside: with taxes we write MM Proposition II as: 
rs = r0 + (B/S) (1-TC ) (r0 - rB )
The Bottom Line
In perfect capital markets, capital structure is 
irrelevant. However, even market imperfections per se are 
not enough to make debt policy matter.
In the next section, we will examine two market
imperfections that do make capital structure matter: taxes
and the costs of financial distress.
What can explain firms' financing choices? We focus
on two market imperfections that we ignored in the last
chapter: taxes and the costs of financial distress.
Taxes
If we assume constant cash flows; and EBIT is the
total cash flow of the firm before interest and taxes,
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ignoring depreciation and other such items as taxes, then 
the taxable income of a 100%-equity financed firm equals
EBIT
For a 100%-equity financed firm, total taxes are
EBITxTc
and earnings after taxes are
EBITx(1-Tc)
taxable income for a levered firm
EBIT - rBB
> total taxes in a levered firm are
(EBIT - rBB) xTc
cash flow going to stockholders
EBIT - rBB - Tex(EBIT - rBB) = (EBIT - rBB) x(l-Tc)
cash flow going to stockholders and bondholders
EBITx(l-Tc) +■TcrBB
Firm U Firm L
EBIT 1000 1000
Interest 0 80
Taxable Income 1000 920
Tax @ 34% 340 321.80
Net Income 660 607.20
Payments to stockholders and bondholders 660 687.20
Interest tax shield (34% x interest) 0 27.20
Figure 3. Firm U/Firm L Tax Shields Chart
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NB: Assume that the tax rate for the firms is T 34
and that the interest rate for the loan is 8%.
Firm L has borrowed $1000 at 8%. The government pays 
34% of L's interest bill, increasing the total income 
available for payout to both stockholders and bondholders.
If L's debt is "permanent," the firm can enjoy a 
perpetual $27.20 tax break from using debt. If we discount
this cash flow at the rate of return on the debt, we have:
PV tax shield = 27.20/0.08 = 340 = TCD.
Note that the PV of tax shields may be less if the
debt is not permanent, or if there is uncertainty about
realizing the tax shields.
This leads to MM's "corrected" Proposition I:
Value of firm = value if all-equity financed + PV
of tax shield
VL = Vu + Tc D
Implication
Unfortunately, MM's corrected Proposition I implies 
that 100% debt financing is optimal. Aside from the 
logical impossibility of this prescription, we don't 
observe firms with market value debt ratios anything close 
to 100% (unless they're about to go bankrupt).
There are 2 possible omissions from the theory which 
could explain why "corrected Proposition I" doesn't
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describe reality (Schlingemann, 1996) . The first is 
personal taxes; the second is financial distress and
agency costs.
Personal Taxes
In the prior example, the firm can deduct interest 
from its corporate tax bill. But, that interest may be
taxable to the bondholder. In contrast, if the firm pays
no interest but retains all its earnings, shareholders may 
pay no taxes (if they don't realize the capital gain).
What does this imply for the relevance of corporate 
financing?
EBIT = $1
If paid as 
interest
If paid as 
equity income
Corporate tax 0 Tc
Income after tax $1 $1-TC
Personal tax tb (l-Tc)Ts
Income after all taxes 1-Tb (1-TS) (1-Tc)
Figure 4. Firm U/Firm L Income After Tax
Borrowing is better if 1-TB.exceeds (1-TS) (1-Tc) ;
otherwise equity financing is better.
Suppose all equity income comes from dividends (or 
all capital gains are realized immediately). Then the 
relative advantage is 1/(1-TC) , since TB and Ts are equal.
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Since this is greater than 1.0, MM are right - use as much
debt as you can.
For debt policy to be irrelevant again, we need 
1-Tb = (1-TS) (1-TC) . This essentially requires the
corporate rate to be less than the personal rate, and for 
Ts to be very small.
Costs of Financial Distress
Value of firm = Value if all equity financed + PV of
tax shield - PV of costs of financial distress If the
costs of financial distress are positive, this implies 
that 100% debt financing is NOT optimal.
What are the Costs of Financial Distress?
Bankruptcy Costs. Bankruptcy is a legal mechanism 
that allows firms to renegotiate the terms of their debt 
contracts. Direct bankruptcy costs are the costs of using 
this legal framework (Schlingemann, 1996).
Indirect bankruptcy costs measure the loss in value 
realized when customers and suppliers abandon a bankrupt
firm. These are hard to measure because it's hard to
disentangle cause and effect, but reasonable estimates are
between 8 and 15% of firm value. NB: It is not the
probability of bankruptcy per se that reduces firm value, 




In addition to explaining the basic leverage (debt 
vs. equity) decision, a functional theory of capital 
structure should also help explain other capital structure 
choices, such as debt maturity, priority, the use of 
callability and convertibility provisions, and the choice 
between public and private financing. As discussed above, 
the contracting-cost theory provides a unified framework 
for analyzing the entire range of capital structure 
choices while most other theories, such as signaling and 
pecking order theories, are at best silent about-and more 
often inconsistent with- the empirical evidence on these
issues.
We can also take this argument a little further to
say that a productive capital structure theory should also 
help explain an even broader array of corporate financial 
policy choices, including dividend, compensation, hedging 
and leasing policies. The empirical evidence suggests that 
companies choose coherent packages of these financial 
policies (Barclay & Smith, 1999). For example, Barclay and 
Smith (1999) add that small high-growth firms tend to have 
not only low leverage ratios and simple capital structures
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(with predominately short-maturity, senior hank debt), but 
also low dividend payouts as well as considerable 
stock-based incentive compensation for senior executives. 
By contrast, large mature companies tend to have high 
leverage, more long-term debt, more complicated capital
structures with a broader range of debt priorities, higher 
dividends, and less incentive compensation (with higher 
reliance on earnings-based bonuses rather than stock-based 
compensation plans). Thus, corporate financing, dividend 
and compensation policies, besides being highly correlated 
with each other, all appear to be driven by the same 
fundamental firm characteristics: investment opportunities 
and (to a lesser extent) firm size (Chew, 2001) . This 
consistent pattern of corporate decision-making suggests
that we now have the rudiments of a unified framework for
explaining most, if not all, financing policy choices.
As mentioned earlier, proponents of the pecking order
theory argue that the information costs associated with
issuing new securities dominate all other costs in
determining capital structure. But, the logic and
predictions of the pecking order theory are at odds with, 
and thus incapable of explaining, most other financial 
policy choices. For example, in suggesting that firms will 
always use the cheapest source of funds, the model implies
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that companies will not simultaneously pay dividends and 
access external capital markets. But this prediction can, 
of course, be rejected simply by glancing at the business
section of most daily newspapers. With the exception of a 
few extraordinary high tech companies like Microsoft and 
Amgen, most large, publicly traded companies pay dividends 
while at the same time regularly rolling over existing
debt with new public issues. As already discussed,
although the pecking order theory predicts that mature
firms that generate lots of free cash flow should
eventually become all equity financed, they are among the 
most highly levered firms in Barclay and Smith's (1999) 
sample. Conversely, the pecking order theory implies that 
high-tech startup firms will have high leverage ratios 
because they often have negative free cash flow and incur 
the largest information costs when issuing equity. But, in 
fact, such firms are financed almost entirely with equity 
(Barclay & Smith, 1999).
Thus, as in the case of debt maturity and priority, 
proponents of the pecking order must go outside of their
theory to explain corporate behavior at both ends of the 
corporate growth spectrum. In so doing, they implicitly 
limit the size and importance of information costs; they 
concede that, at least for the most mature and
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highest-growth sectors, information costs are less
important than other considerations in corporate financing
decisions.
After opposing the above schools of thoughts and
theories all the way since more than half a century, I 
would like to ask the same question that Myers asked in 
his 1984 article entitled "The Capital Structure Puzzle":
"How do firms choose their capital structure?" Well, after 
going through the different theories, I am aligning myself 
to Myers' answer "We don't know."
It is very lucid that the capital structure theories 
have explained a good part of the capital structure 
decision-making actions, but I still believe that they do 
not explain with certitude all the managers' behaviors in 
constructing their firms' capital structures. On the one
hand, the pecking order theory fails to explain some 
firms' financial structure as described in the high-tech 
industries example above; and in such a manner, we feel we 
cannot totally rely on this theory. On the.other hand, the 
tradeoff theory is not perfect either. For example, as I 
mentioned earlier, the tradeoff theory cannot account for 
the correlation between high profitability and low debt
ratios. It does no good to say that managers are
"excessively conservative" or "not-value-maximizing." I
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strongly think that none of the existing theories in 
capital structure is a perfect model explaining managers' 
behaviors and that we can recommend as sculpt to be
followed by business leaders.
To sum up, let's ask ourselves: why should the firm's
managers be concerned today about the firm's future 
ability to expropriate its bondholders or potential other 
equity investors, or to pursue suboptimal real investment 
strategies? After all, it could benefit their clientele, 
current equity. Yet, upon reflection, it becomes clear 
that when investors, can be expropriated in the future, 
they will demand a higher compensation upfront. This 
reduces the firm's financing flexibility, and thus
typically forces firms to offer a higher expected rate of 
return today to issue their preferred capital structure,
or to make compromises and forego some positive NPV 
projects. By the same token, a firm that is more likely to 
take only the best projects in the future is worth more 
today. A firm that has both debt and equity, rather than
equity only, may not be able to commit itself to the best
future actions, resulting in a loss of value and
competitive advantage today.
The real world is considerably more complex in that 
firms typically do not face each of the above problems in
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isolation, but all at the same time. The presence of one
problem may worsen another. For example, there can be 
significant costs to move from a suboptimal to an optimal 
capital structure. If a firm is close to bankruptcy,
issuing equity could avoid or reduce bankruptcy costs, 
which increase firm value. But the infusion of more equity 
may mostly benefit bondholders, so equity holders may not 
be inclined to issue more equity. So, although capital 
structure reorganization could install a new capital 
structure to increase firm value, there are problems to be 
resolved to get there, given the current capital
structure.
Ultimately, the trick in being a good manager is to 
weigh costs and benefits of projects, debts, and equity, 
and to have sound judgment in deciding on a good 
combination thereof. Although we have seen a multitude of 
theories explaining the crowds of forces interacting to 
get a better capital structure, choosing a good capital
structure remains as much an art as it is a science.
In addition, I think that the tradeoff theory is more
of the model I would recommend for use with coordination
with the pecking order theory. The tradeoff model suggests 
keeping a target debt ratio that rationalizes the firm
capital structure and financing behavior. This is a
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coherent model that keeps the financial managers'
forecasts and analysis safe to some extent. If we add to 
this model some use of the pecking order, this will lead 
the capital structure to a conservative and safe pavement
protecting the firm's value. This might push the research 
to a tradeoff between the existing tradeoff theory and the 
pecking order model.
The question I am going to answer is "How should we 
proceed to get such a swapping model out of the existing
theories?"
If we can find a balanced model trading between these 
two theories, it will possibly be the new alternative for 
managers to scientifically set up their firms' capital 
structures. A good line of attack I would recommend this
balanced theory to come into view is to choose a bucket of 
optimal firms (that we assume they should be our target 
from a performance perspective) and elaborate an empirical 
study on the mixture of their capital structures to
extract the common features of the structures of their
capitals. If we start from the point where we assume the 
tradeoff theory concentrates on the ratios analysis, and 
the pecking order theory focuses on the costs analysis, 
then a correlation coefficient study between these two 
variables (debt-ratios and costs) would explain the
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behaviors and orientations of an eventual model for the
sake of an optimal capital structure. The
tradeoff-pecking-order new theory will present a potential
starting point for future researches and investigations 
looking for the scientific answers concerning the
existence of an optimal capital structure that the
existing theories do not solve.
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